The Arab Spring revealed the rise of Islamists and a wave of Islamic movements across the region. The Islamist agenda is debatable on issues regarding their commitment to democracy, pluralism and individual freedom. Central to this is understanding their evolving definition of Islamism' and how the players view themselves. The article provides a brief background on which to describe and define the modern Islamist. The features of Islamist political parties are described. The researcher offers a definition of neo-Islamism that reflects its most modern trends, including characteristics: non-traditional religiosity; gradualism; Islam modernization; nationalism, and; pragmatic relations with the West.
Neo-Islamism in the Post-Arab Spring
One of the most obvious facets of the 2011 Arab revolutions is the rise of Islamists and Islamic political parties. In the wake of that major political upheaval in the region, most of those Islamists were either in prison, in Western exile or operating underground. Some scholars argue that while Islamist militants and organizations did not trigger the Arab Spring, or even participate in the Tunisian and then Egyptian uprisings, they are 'hijacking' the Arab Spring in their quest for power (Bradley 2012; Cavatorta 2012) . Controversies about the role and agenda of the Arab Islamists, as well as their taking part in these revolutions, have reignited the longstanding debate about Islamism and its commitment to democracy, pluralism and individual freedoms.
Although Islamists did not trigger the large-scale popular uprisings:
[their] decades-long resistance to autocratic rulers turned them into shadow governments in the peoples' eyes. A vote for the Islamists implied a clean break with the failed past and a belief (to be tested) that they could deliver the goods-jobs, economic stability, transparency, and inclusiveness. (Gerges 2013, p. 390) In addition, the dramatic evolution of the uprisings since early 2013 brought Islamist groups to the forefront of Arab politics, triggering reconsideration of the terrorism factor, military coup d'état models, and the urgent need to review moderate Islamism and its commitment to pluralism and democracy. Also needed is a thorough examination of the quick Islamism is a wide and diverse phenomenon with many undercurrents and tendencies.
However, this paper focuses on Islamism as a moderate movement, as gleaned from recent history and trending, with its main characteristics and commitment to democracy and pluralism examined. The discussion includes a forecast of possible scenarios for Islamism's near-term future.
What is Islamism?
Political Islamism is a relatively modern phenomenon within Islamic societies across the world. The terms Islamism and Islamist in the political sense were never used in Arab or Muslim societies until the early twentieth century, coinciding precisely with the fall of the 'Last Caliphate' of the Ottoman Empire in 1924.
One famous Muslim theologian during the tenth century, Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (874-936) published his influential book, The Essays of the Islamists, which features a compilation of various narratives by Muslim scholars and theologians. Modern Islamism, however, has very little to do with theology or even Islamic laws or 'sharia'. It is an ideological phenomenon that aspires to excellence, though, viewing sharia as part of the utopian political system. Islamism has social as well as political aspirations, aiming to integrate Islam as such into politics, state affairs, economics and civil and constitutional laws. The most accurate definition is probably that of Mohammad Ayoob, who described Islamism as 'a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives ' (2008, p. 2) . Ultimately, political Islam is a contemporary political ideology, rather than a religion, religious cult or theology.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's famous slogan: 'Islam is the Solution', indicates that Islamism is a socio-political movement in the first place. However, Islamism, as Greg Barton pointed out:
[covers a] broad spectrum of convictions, at one extreme are those who would merely like to see Islam accorded proper recognition in national life in terms of national symbols. At the other extreme are those who want to see the radical transformation of society and politics, by whatever means, into an absolute theocracy. (Ayoob 2008, p. 2) However, the growth of the Islamist extremism and so-called Islamic terrorism has made Islamist movements synonymous with al-Qaeda and alike international groups (Cavatorta 2012a; Roy 2012 (Sunni, Shia, Alavi, etc) . The most highly regarded scholars and authorities in the field were the Islamic theologists, specialized in dialectic and rhetoric, known as Ulamaa Kalām (literally, speech scientists). 'Kalām' is the Islamic philosophy of seeking theological principles through dialectic.
As Euben (2006) explains, Muslim political theorists:
were and are engaged in a series of debates within Islamic tradition about for example, the nature of political authority, the relationship between reason and revealed knowledge, and the proper way to be a Muslim. (p. 298) Islamic philosophers discussed theological themes, such as the holy books, the prophets and messengers, how to prove the existence of God and the God sovereignty, but they also discussed highly controversial political issues in depth.
Ever since that early stage of the Muslim state, scholars and intellectuals have often been used by secular and religious rulers alike, to justify, manipulate and misguide the Muslim communities about their breaches of the sacred texts and to cover their illegal deeds. Over twelve centuries, the huge number of debates rarely evolved into an independent Islamic political science, nor did they go so far as to develop tools to define and protect personal political and civic rights, public liberties or to share power. As a matter of fact, the modern concept of reinstalling Islam into public life and considering politics an authentic part of religion was developed by 19th and 20th century thinkers who were motivated by the provocation of direct contact with the West. The most prominent of these thinkers are Jamal Eddin al-Afghani, Mohammed Abdah and Mohammed Rashid Rida, the founder of a famous intellectual magazine called el-Manar. Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, reportedly worked with Rida and was strongly influenced by his reformist opinions.
Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh's reformist views of authentic Islam as being a rational religion should be seen within a long tradition of tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform) in Islamic intellectual history and jurisprudence over centuries (Euben 2006, p. 301 Despite Jamal Abd al-Nasser's accusations of coup plot during mid-1960s, which were never proven and always denied by MB, and despite the widespread torture of MB prisoners, and unlike MB splinter groups such as Gamaa Islamiyya (Islamic Group, or 'IG") and Jihad Islami (Islamic Jihad or "IJ"), MB was never involved in armed uprisings. 'Seventy years of cautious politics hardly qualify a movement as revolutionary' (Roy 2013 ).
Yet, the organization that has spread its branches over eighty countries has failed to lobby governments worldwide, contrary to what one might expect from a transnational organization that may claim hundreds of millions of potential members, be they activists or mere sympathizers. The MB has no great geostrategic design, as Roy (2013) Over the next twenty years, ordinary Muslims became fed up with the bloodshed that violent extremism caused. The toll of death and destruction that radical Islamism left in its wake also diverted interest in militancy and jihad (Roy 2012c) .
As a result of MB's failure to achieve remarkable success almost anywhere in the Arab world, a new generation started to speak up and denounce some of old ideological concepts. The rivalry of older and younger generations are reflected in internal changes within mainstream Islamism. The young generation, unlike the old guard who continues to dominate the top ranks and decision-making, has been more eager for pluralism, adopting liberal concepts such as democracy and transitioning of power.
A key aspect of MB political and intellectual evolution is its move towards what they call a 'civil state', which integrates the utopian ideal of sharia with a democratic system that claims to protect a wide range of civil liberties (Tudoroiu 2011) . The MB movement's discourse on democracy during the 2000s, which when:
confronted with the authoritarian regime's harsh repression, [turned] parliamentary democracy, full political freedoms and the end to all exceptional laws into central planks of its message and campaigns. The movement even became the largest and most effective force in the short-lived pro-democracy movement of 2004 -2006 . (Tudoroiu 2011 However, this significant shift was the result of a complex internal debate, and has touched mostly on political concepts and strategy, rather than marking a real change of ideology. Human rights groups, furthermore, fear that a Brotherhood-controlled government could impose strict social and political restrictions on women and Coptic Christians. Evidence from President Morsi's performance triggered these fears and provoked the secularists, liberals and Christians who failed to get a slice of the cake, or find common ground with MB and its agenda.
Post-Islamism and Neo-Islamism:
The term neo-Islamism has been widely used in the last twenty years in the media, and consequently by academics from various institutions to describe the phenomena of political
Islam. Academics such as Khalifa (2012) , Ibahrine (2012) , and Boubekeur (2012) used the term without defining it, though it appears that they mean the so called 'moderate Islamism' mostly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood movements, and might be extended to Turkey's AKP.
Mark LeVine sums up this terminology confusion in the following terms:
What makes the people and situations I have encountered 'new', 'post' or 'beyond' the traditional boundaries of what scholars describe as 'Islamism' (that is, religiously-grounded politics or social activism) is that they involve a redefinition of Islam and Muslim practice in which the bona fides of a particular action or believe from an orthodox Islamic legal or theological perspective, is no longer the primary criterion for judging whether it is properly 'Islamic'. (Boubekeur 2012, p. 206 Wright fit Sunni Islamism into three categories: the first category refers to classical Islamism, which includes mainly the Salafis and some ultra classical thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood like Seyyed Kuttb; the second category refers to neo-Islamism described above; the third category is post-Islamism, where 'its adherents separate religious and political discourse, although they do not divorce values from politics (Wright 2012a ). Under Wright's classifications, the post-Islamists will not embrace classical secularism, but on the other hand, they will not propagate sharia. As individuals, they might be pious Muslims and consider values and morals to be pivotal in political life. Wright cites Turkey's AKP as a typical example of post-Islamism (Wright 2012b ). Wright's characterization, however, only provides a description of neo-Islamist values and some of their activities, rather than delivering a scientific definition or a method of distinguishing it from other types of Islamism.
In a recent paper, Roy (2012) uses the word 'new Islamists' to describe these old Islamist parties that are facing this new era of transition, from illegality under the old regimes, to power, noting the enormous changes in ideology and day to day politics. According to Roy: The new Islamist brand will increasingly mix technocratic modernism and conservative values. The movements that have entered the political mainstream cannot now afford to turn their backs on multiparty politics for fear of alienating a significant portion of the electorate that wants stability and peace, not revolution. Bayat's definition is quite similar to that of Olivier Roy's (2008 Roy's ( , 2011 . The problem comes less from post-Islamism's recognition of modernity than from the belated nature of this recognition: this modernity has long been evident, even if deliberately and explicitly denied in the discourse of the political actors concerned. (p. 221)
Burgat gave examples of a significant minority of academic observers like Esposito, Fuller,
Binder and Entelis who back this view (p. 221).
Within the Tunisian context, for example, the new religiosity and adoption of modernity before the uprising (while most Ennahda leaders and supporters were either in exile, in prison or underground) influenced the way in which Ennahda was re-established, behaved and, to an extent, changed during its revival in Tunisia after January 2011 (Cavatorta 2012 ).
Ennahda is classified as 'post-Islamist' amongst its supporters, candidates and voters, according to Roy and Bayat's descriptions. Ennahda leaders concluded that the events of the Jasmine Revolution that ousted Ben Ali, despite its not being born of an organized movement, proved that if they do not catch up with the trends of the protesters, they would lose ground forever. (This is not to say that Ennahda leaders and supporters did not attend the protests in their individual capacity; they in fact did.) Ennahda would have to turn the old format of 'brotherhood' into a true modern political party:
trying to rally a larger constituency than hard-core devout Muslims, recasting religious norms as more vague conservative values (family, property, work ethic, honesty) adopting a neoliberal approach to the economy, and endorsing a constitution, and parliament and regular elections. (Roy 2011a, n.p.) The Turkish ruling party AKP similarly provided an interesting example of how the failure of Islamism in government in the mid 1990s led to rethinking of it, which eventually delivered a series of poll victories of the AKP (Cavatorta 2012) . Notable here is the fact that the AKP and Ennahda Islamists did not sacrifice traditional preaching within a movement or party. Rather, the groups as a whole made the adjustments, which corrected their previous errors and changed their priorities from global shariatization to democracy and the nationstate. The same individuals belong to the same Islamic parties, but with merged interests, in an era with new rules and constraints. They are not post-Islamists; they are Islamists with a new worldview.
Neo-Islamism is more a tactical strategy than a new ideology. Although it contains some ideological shifting, the changes are not fundamental. Neo-Islamists remain faithful towards the dream of creating of a state based on sharia, like the old Islamists. However, this might draw some confusion, as neo-Islamists like Erdoğan and Ghanouchi, have tended to dispel the notion that they are ultimately seeking to establish an Islamic state. In fact, the neoIslamists prefer to focus on strategy rather than explicit aims, relying on the gradualist's approach, which requires patience, concession and sometimes secrecy, and not broad slogans and emotional propaganda. Turkish AKP leaders in particular maintain that they are not Islamists, that they advocate secularism, and have no intention of implementing sharia law.
Ghanouchi would not go so far as to advocate secularism, or drop sharia laws from Ennahda's agenda. However, he confessed that secularism could be part of Islam as mean of separation of powers (Ghanouchi 2013, pers.comm. April) . He previously triggered the sympathy of, and widely surprised the Tunisian secularist elite in a lecture delivered at a think tank 2 March 2012 stating as much (Ghanouchi 2012, p. 15 This latest view turns every Islamist into a post-Islamist who has reconciled with democracy and has turned it into the norm, acknowledging that Islamism and Islamists did not completely fail, so much as revisit and revise its old paradigms. However, we distinguish these post-Arab Spring
Islamists from traditional Islamists, by classifying them as neo-Islamists.
Due to the recent Arab revolutions, the question of Islam's compatibility with democracy is no longer at the center of theological debate, though some marginal Islamist leaders and their followers doubt such compatibility. What Asef Bayat (1996) observed is an emerging new form of religiosity, which seems more in tune with the democratic ethos. Furthermore, Roy observed that some moderate Islamic thinkers who lived in exile during the last twenty years, such as Rashid Ghanouchi, co-founder of Tunisia's Ennahda Party, came to the conclusion almost twenty years before the Arab uprisings that democracy was a better tool to fight dictatorships than the call for either jihad or sharia (Roy 2012b ). Ghanouchi has insisted that since the foundation of the Islamic Tendency Movement (IMT) in June 1981: we adopted the democratic methods in full and we declared in that day that we are a democratic movement. Then, we reviewed then many concepts, on top of them the sovereignty; to see it since as derives from people not from Allah. We started to distinguish between Islam as reference and as source of power. Islam is not a source of power for anyone! The people only who validate the power and legitimate it. (Ghanouchi 2013, pers.comm.) Characteristics of neo-Islamism: [varies] significantly; as recently as 2008, the AKP itself was defined by the majority in Turkey's Constitutional Court as being 'anti-secular' and only narrowly escaped a move to have it shut it down on those grounds. (Kuru 2013) While it is difficult to compare the Tunisian Ennahda Party with AKP due to historical differences and experiences in the current strife between Islamism and secularism , leaders like Rashid Ghanouchi believe that Ennahda will take the path of AKP and will achieve the same success. Arab MB leaders such as Ghanouchi, Yussef Qaradawi and Salim al-Awaa have gradually transformed party definitions of the state, citizenship, the Islamic nation and political participation in the last twenty years. This transformation in ideology would be necessary to align the party with the new religious youth, the instruments of change in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, and to encourage them to join or vote for the party in their first free election. This is where the so-called 'post-Islamism' forces join these newly renovated parties after the Arab revolutions according to Bayat (2011) and Roy (2011) .
In a recent article, Roy uses the word 'new Islamists' to describe these particular Islamist parties that are facing this era of transition, from illegality under the old regimes, to power, and the enormous, notable changes in ideology and day-to-day politics. The term 'post-Islamism' would apply to young students and newly graduated unemployed men and women who never Gradualism is change that occurs or should occur in small steps. In politics, a gradualist believes that tiny changes are better than rapid ones. The so-called neo-fundamentalists, according to Roy (2011 Roy ( , 2012 (Bayat 1996; Cavatorta 2012; Esposito and Burgat 2003; Roy 2008 Roy , 2011 . While modernization does not necessarily mean Westernization or economic and technological development, neo-Islamists would argue that Islam is compatible with modern scientific inventions, cutting-edge technologies, as well as with most democratic and pluralist values that spread from the West.
Asef Bayat (1996) Another of neo-Islamism's leaders, Erdoğan and his party AKP, enjoy a cooperative relationship with the USA and NATO nations, as Turkey is an active and strategic NATO member. Erdoğan is keen for Turkey to join the EU, despite the continuous rejection by its European neighbours, allegedly due to the country's religious and ethnic nature.
Recent American State Department's leaked documents and interviews seem to suggest that the United States' new strategy in the Arab world is to work closely with these neoIslamists, supporting them in power so as to replace the old autocratic allies, while continuing to fight jihadis considered a threat to US security since 9/11 (Elmaazi 2012) .
On this precise pragmatic tendency, Gerges (2013) noted:
Increasing evidence shows that the balance of social forces among Islamists has shifted toward pragmatists. It is a generational shift that favors technocrats and professionals, such as engineers, dentists, doctors, attorneys, and teachers, who are open-minded and reformist, less obsessed with dogmas, identity, and culture wars, and more willing to build governing coalitions with ideological opponents, whether they are non Muslim, liberal, or secular. Within the moderate Tunisian neo-Islamist context, observers like Cavatorta and Merone (2013) noted that harsh security measures and oppression had been imposed on Tunisians for decades, which pushed political players and Islamists to find alternatives and to make concessions on the go. Additionally, the rejection they faced: made it possible and necessary for Ennahda to entirely re-elaborate how political Islam could contribute to the developmental trajectory of the country. From this elaboration flows the acceptance of the dominant discourse of democracy, liberalism, and market economy without which the party would not have been able to find much space in Tunisia. (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, p. 859) Moderation is a long journey for the Islamists, and they have to show their sincerity and commitment to democracy, pluralism and institutional transitioning of power. When asked whether Islam needs secularism, Ghanouchi has given vague answers such as Islam has not endured for so long because of states' influence but rather due to the large acceptance it enjoys among its adherents, in fact the state has often been a burden on religion. . . . [Should] religion be entirely emancipated from the state and politics, this would also carry some risks whereby things would get out of control and social harmony would be endangered. The way to do it, therefore, is to find a balance that would guarantee people's freedom and rights, because religion is here to do exactly that. To achieve this balance, we need to go back to the issue of distinguishing between religion and politics and adjust the parameters of what is constant in religion and that which is variable. (Ghanouchi 2012, pp.13-14) Ghanouchi's statements show that Ennahda is being driven by the exigencies of politics, which allows for wide interpretation of doctrine. The constant changing of position, furthermore, depends on necessity and calculation of formulas that fall within maqasid a-sharia (aims or objectives of sharia). Such elasticity is a core characteristic of neo-Islamism, especially after the Arab Spring.
The Ennahda-led government in Tunisia (from December 2011 until January 2014)
showed utmost respect to this historic agreement and towards the toleration principle.
Ennahda's contribution to the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) was forty-two women--a larger percentage than all of the secular parties combined. Ennahda leaders 'reassured Tunisian citizens that it [would] not interfere in their personal lives and . . .
[would] respect their basic human rights' (Growder, Griffiths, and Hasan 2014, p. 123) .
With these assurances came tensions between the Salafis and Ennahda, based on the belief that Ennahda's attempts to be seen as a 'moderate' Islamic party resulted in improper concessions in matters of religious doctrine.
Comparing Ennahda to Egypt's MB reveals Ennahda's political savvy, particularly with regards to the 'half-caste' neo-Islamists. President Morsi was in office for roughly one year before the army ousted him. While in office, he issued a controversial sort of constitutional coup, which demonstrated Morsi and MB's tendency towards autocracy and a refusal to cooperate with the opposition, let alone to share the administration with the opposition and politicians from outside the MB (Duran 2013).
New definition of neo-Islamism
From the discussion above, we conclude that neo-Islamism' adherents have adjusted and developed such concepts, priorities and agendas of Islamic politics in response to the urgent question, 'What went wrong?' The impetus has been to redress prior failure to execute state shariatization and societal Islamization. In the absence of a proper definition, the author proposes the following definition of neo-Islamism:
Neo-Islamism is a tendency that emerged within the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood movement and its pro-democracy affiliates in the Muslim World, which uses liberal sets of concepts, for tactical or strategic purposes, while pursuing the same traditional goals of the Islamic movement.
Conclusion
Some pundits doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood movement is changing conceptually, adopting democracy or considering any new or moderate versions of Islamism, nor that it is reviewing Islamic fundamentalism. American author, John Bradley, went so far as to suggest that Islamists have hijacked the Arab Spring (Bradley 2012, p. 2) .
The West would do well to monitor the spread of Arab democracy in coming years.
Judging from the recent military coup that deposed Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, the ongoing violence in Syria, and relative stability of the new Tunisian government, the only thing that can be counted on is that, despite the overwhelming outrage at Middle East's authoritarian regimes and the hope of the Arab Spring, Islamist parties are diverse and no future can be certain. Despite the majority's apparent longing for democracy and Islamist parties' claims of compatibility with democracy, only time will reveal the long-term impact of neo-Islamism on the political scene in the Middle East and North Africa, and on society at large in that part of the world. 
